

RSA-based signatures 1

1. The RSA assumption states that every PPT adversary A has at most negligible success in...

- (A) ...given N and e , to compute $d = e^{-1} \pmod{\phi(N)}$
- (B) ...given N , e , and d , to compute $\phi(N)$
- (C) ...given N , e , and y (randomly chosen from \mathbb{Z}_N), to compute x with $x^e = y \pmod N$
- (D) ...given N , to compute the factors P and Q of N

2. Even if the RSA assumption holds, the textbook RSA scheme allows a PPT attacker...

- (A) ...given pk , a random message m^* , and two signatures for self-chosen messages $m_1, m_2 \neq m^*$ (that may depend on m^*), to compute a signature for m^*
- (B) ...given pk , a random message m^* , and one signature for a self-chosen message $m \neq m^*$ (that may depend on m^*), to compute a signature for m^*
- (C) ...given pk , and a random message m^* , to compute a signature for m^*
- (D) ...given only pk , to compute the corresponding secret key sk
- (E) ...given only pk , to compute a signature for a self-chosen message m^*